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At times, development in the field of intellectual history is guaranteed by the kind 
of productive misunderstanding embodied by Nicholas Cusanus's reception of the 
dictum quodlibet in quolibet, attributed to Anaxagoras. As Aristotle states, 
Anaxagoras held that everything has been mixed in everything, therewith account- 
ing for the complex phenomenon of change.' The dictum quodlibet in quolibet 
accordingly is to be understood as restricted to the elementary level: "in every- 
thing there is a portion of everything, except of the intelligence."z This restriction 
entirely disappeared in Cusanus's interpretation of the dictum, presumably under 
the influence of the Dominican theologian Eckhart of Hochheim.3 
Eckhart positively identified the dictum quodlibet in quolibet as an idea 
expressed in the eleventh proposition of the Liber de causis.4 Generally in his 
work, it is applied to spiritual beings, although sometimes it serves more specifi- 
cally as a proprietas divinorum.5 If we take into consideration that, for instance, 
Thomas Aquinas is well aware of the physical background of the dictum quodlibet 
in quolibet attached to the name Anaxagoras, Eckhart deliberately seems to 
transpose the Anaxagorean dictum from a physical to a metaphysical or even 
This article is an adaptation of a lecture held at Waseda University, Tokyo in October 
1996. Jan A. Aertsen, Hans Gerhard Senger, and Carlos Steel commented on an earlier 
draft. Michael Gorman and Martin Tracey helped in preparing the English version of this 
text. 
1. Aristotle, Phys. I,4 (187bl). 
2.  Anaxagoras, fr. B 11 (DielsJKranz 11, 37). 
3. Cf. H. Wackerzapp, Der EinfluP Meister Eckharts auf die ersten philosophischen 
Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450), (Miinster, 1960), pp. 168ff. 
4. Cf. Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 320 (LW III,269,7-9): "spiritibus ergo adhaerere est mutuo 
se totis penetrare, quodlibet esse in quolibet. Et hoc est quod in De causis dicitur: 'pri- 
morum omnium quaedam sunt in quibusdam' etc." Cf. Liber de causis prop. 11 (ed. Pattin, 
p. 161): "Primorum omnium quaedam sunt in quibusdam per modum quo licet ut sit unum 
eorum in alio." 
5. Cf. Eckhart, In Sap. n. 271 (LW 11, 601, 5-7): "Haec est proprietas divi- 
norum, . . . quod in minimo habetur maximum, quodlibet in quolibet"; In Eccli. n. 20 (LW 
11, 248, 1): "in divinis quodlibet est in quolibet." 
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theological setting.6 What remains a matter of conjecture in the case of Meister
Eckhart becomes, as we will see, a matter of fact in Cusanus, who seeks for a new
and deeper founding of the Anaxagorean dictum.
Laying this new foundation, Cusanus makes use of an argument, which also
stems from the Latin work of Meister Eckhart, namely, the mediative function of
the universe. In Eckhart, as in Cusanus, the universe serves as an intermediary
between God and particular being. Although Eckhart reveals himself in the
Prologi in Opus tripartitum as a "thinker of immediacy," the patron of the thesis
that every singular being receives its transcendental perfections from God imme-
diately, he apparently feels the urge to develop the mediative function of the
universe as a conceptual safeguard that will make possible the philosophically
significant expression of the idea of a "divine inherence."7 This doctrine of the
mediative function of the universe is central in this paper.
In the fourth chapter of the second book of De docta ignorantia, Nicholas explains
that in the process of contraction there is, on the side of contracted being, a
maximum, which, as maximum contractum, receives the properties of the Absolute
maximum contractedly—similitudo absoluti. This maximum contractum, he de-
clares, is the universe. It contains everything contractedly, just as the Absolute
maximum contains everything absolutely. Although the Absolute maximum ex-
cludes all plurality, whereas the contracted maximum entirely includes it, both the
Absolute and the contracted maximum are maximally one.
"God, who is one, is in the one universe," Cusanus says, "whilst the universe
is contractedly in all things."8 God is in the particular entities absolutely that
which they are—quidditas absoluta. Under this aspect of divine "inherence,"
things are not distinct from one another. The universe, on the other hand, is in the
particular entities contractedly that which they are. Of course, these quidditates
contractae are distinct, for the quidditas contracta is nothing but the thing itself.
Consequently, only the universe inheres in things in such a way that it is these
things themselves.9
In the concluding section of the fourth chapter Cusanus deduces the insight
"how God, who is most simple unity, as he exists in the one universe, is, as if in
6. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Phys. I, 4 1.9 (Leon, ed., 30): "quod quodlibet esset in
quolibet, ut Anaxagoras posuit."
7. Cf. Eckhart, Prol in Op. prop. n. 13 (LW 1,172,15-173,2): "omne ens et singulum
non solum habet, sed et immediate, absque omni prorsus medio, habet a deo totum suum
esse, totam suam unitatem, veritatem et totam suam bonitatem."
8. Cusanus, Dill, 4 (Opera omnίa I, 75, 13-15): "Deus igitur, qui est unus, est in uno
universo, universum vero est in universis contracte."
9. Cf. DIII, 4 (Opera omnia I, 74, 9-24).
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consequence, through the mediation of the universe in all things, and the plurality
of things is through the mediation of the one universe in God."10 Eventually, the
mutual inherence of God and the particular entities, mediated by the one universe,
gives rise to a deeper foundation of the dictum of Anaxagoras: quodlibet in
quolibet.n It is, so to speak, a basic insight.
The mediati ve function of the universe in the mutual inherence of God and par-
ticular being is established with recourse to the mediati ve function of the universe in
the procession of particular being. Cusanus explains that "the beings which are
parts of the universe, and without which the universe, since it is contracted, could
not be one and whole and perfect, sprang into existence together with the uni-
verse."
12
 With the universe, all of its parts are produced, as it is the essential charac-
teristic of the universe to include them. It is significant that Cusanus considers the
relation of the universe to the particular beings as a relation of totum and partes.
Simul cum universo in esse prodierunt—the simultaneity of the universe and
its parts serves as an argument in countering the position oϊAvicenna et aliiphiloso-
phi, who held that there was first an intelligence, then a noble soul, and then na-
ture.13 Having validated this simultaneity, Cusanus next disputes it from the
craftsman's point of view: "Just as in a craftsman's design the whole, for instance a
house, is prior to a part, for instance a wall, so because all things sprang into exist-
ence from God's design, we say that first there appeared the universe and thereafter
all things, without which it could be neither a universe nor perfect."14 Instead of
"from God's design," the Latin has the unequivocal clause "ex intentione dei,"
which restates the priority of the universe as that of aprimum intentum.
The mediati ve function of the universe results, ultimately, from the state of
the universe as primarily intended. Absolutely, Cusanus says, the Absolute maxi-
mum is only present in the universe, which is contractedly all things—we there-
fore have to consider the Absolute maximum to be antecedently in the contracted
maximum and only subsequently in all particulars.15 As God is absolutely present
10. DIII, 4 {Opera omnia I, 75, 16-18): "Et ita intelligi potent, quomodo Deus, qui
est unitas simplicissima, existendo in uno universo est quasi ex consequenti mediante
universo in omnibus, et pluralitas rerum mediante uno universo in Deo."
11. Cf. DI II, 5 {Opera omnia I, 76, 3-9): "Si acute iam dicta attendis, non erit tibi
difficile videre veritatis illius Anaxagorici 'quodlibet esse in quolibet' fundamentum fortas-
sis altius Anaxagora. Nam cum manifestum sit ex primo libro Deum ita esse in omnibus,
quod omnia sunt in ipso, et nunc constet Deum quasi mediante universo esse in omnibus,
hinc omnia in omnibus esse constat et quodlibet in quolibet."
12. DI II, 4 {Opera omnia I, 74, 28-75,2): "Omnia autem entia, quae sunt partes
universi, sine quibus universum—cum sit contractum—unum, totum et perfectum esse non
posset, simul cum universo in esse prodierunt."
13. Cf. DI II, 4 {Opera omnia I, 75 2-4).
14. DI II, 4 {Opera omnia I, 75, 4-8): "sicut in intentione artificis est prius totum,
puta domus, quam pars, puta paries, ita dicimus, quia ex intentione Dei omnia in esse
prodierunt, quod tune universum prius prodiit et in eius consequentiam omnia, sine quibus
nee universum nee perfectum esse posset."
15. DI II, 4 {Opera omnia I, 75, 8-11): "absolutum maximum in contracto maximo
prioriter consideramus, ut sit consequenter in omnibus particularibus, quia est absolute in
eo, quod est omnia contracte."
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in that which is contractedly all things, and which is contractedly in all things, it
is through the mediation of the one universe that He is in all things and that all
things are in Him.
II
It is generally accepted that Cusanus took over the argument of the mediative
function of the universe from Meister Eckhart of Hochheim.16 In fact, all relevant
elements are taken from Eckhart's commentary on the Book of Wisdom, in which
he develops the idea of the mediative function of the universe in the procession of
particular being.17 This text has an overt parallel in what is to be considered
Eckhart's Hexaemeron—the beginning of his first commentary on Genesis—in
which he proposes this doctrine as the better alternative among a series of answers
to the question of the procession of multitude.18
Commenting on Wisdom 1:14 ("creavit enim, ut essent omnia"), Eckhart
stresses the word omnia and consequently reads the text as an indication that the
whole of the universe was intended in creation. Affirming the universe as finis
creationis, he states that every agent by itself always intends the whole (ipsum
totum), as the craftsman primarily intends the house itself, its parts only in
16. Cf. Wackerzapp, Der Einfluβ Meister Eckharts, pp. 109ff.
17. In the broader context of his expositions Cusanus is likewise dependent on
Eckhart. The idea that God is in things only absolutely, without the contraction to hoc et
hoc—cf. DIII, 4 (Opera omnia I, 75,12-13): "Contractio dicit ad aliquid, ut ad essendum
hoc vel illud"—that is distinctive for createdness, reflects Eckhart's distinction between
esse absolute and esse hoc et hoc, which gives rise to a restriction of divine inherence to
the level of absolute being. Cf. Eckhart, In Ioh. n. 206 (LW III, 174, 4): "Est quidem deus
in quolibet, ut illud ens est, in nullo autem, ut illud est hoc ens." This passage is annotated
by Nicholas in his private codex with the words "quomodo deus in omnibus et tamen in
nullo." Cf. Wackerzapp, Der Einfluβ Meister Eckharts, p. 134.
18. The question "quomodo ab uno simplici, puta a deo, possint immediate esse seu
produci plura distincta et diversa" is explored here in the recapitulation of the answers
suggested by Thomas and Avicenna, whose solution immediately evokes the comments of
Maimonides and, again, Thomas, joined by the apparently not unsatisfying apology pro-
posed by quidam ex maioribus mundi. These answers are followed by explanations of the
immediate procession of multitude under the regime of natural necessity—a provocative
thesis!—which Eckhart, as he himself claims, is apt to give usually together with this third
and better rejoinder: "Tertio et melius dico quo re vera ab uno uniformiter se habente
semper unum procedit immediate. Sed hoc unum est ipsum totum universum, quod a deo
procedit, unum quidem in multis partibus universi . . . Ex his patet rudis quorundam
quaestio et dubitatio qua quaeritur utrum deus prius produxerit angelum aut aliam quam-
libet creaturam quam reliquam. Produxit enim immediate non hanc aut aliam partem
universi, sed ipsum totum universum immediate, quod, inquam, universum non produceret
nee esset universum, si quid partium essentialium deesset. Ex aequo autem universum non
esset, si lapis vel lignum deesset, aut si natura angelici spiritus deesset" (In Gen. I nn.
10-13; LW I, 193, 11-197,4).
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function of the whole. Being the primum agens, by Himself God produced and
created in the first place the universe, which contains everything as its and
everything's parts, because of the universe and in the universe.19 Several elements
of the text in Cusanus already become visible here, i.e. the metaphor of the
craftsman, the relation of totum and partes, and the idea of the universe as
primarily intended in creation.20
The most crucial step, however, remains to be taken. At stake is what a Latin
sermon reckons among the disputabilia, the classical question: "How are the
many things immediately from the simple One?"21 And indeed, the question can
only be how a multitude comes immediately from the simple One, because that
such immediate procession is to be accepted within a Christian context evidently
results from the incommunicability of the act of creation. Eckhart's answer to this
question is almost trivial: Immediately produced by the One is the universe, which
as a whole contains a multitude of parts.
With this solution Eckhart disjoins two traditionally coupled theses, namely
the axiom that from the One immediately comes one thing only—ex uno non fit
nisi unum— and the doctrine of the gradual procession of multitude:
And thus perishes the question and difficulty, which burdens many people to
this day, how from the simple One, which is God, immediately can be many
things. For some hold, like Avicenna and his followers, that Intelligence is
first and immediately created by the First, and all others subsequently by
this Intelligence. Hence, one must say that the whole universe as one
whole . . . descends from the simple One, one from the One, first and imme-
diately.22
Eckhart defends the axiom ex uno non nisi unum, but rejects the correlated
doctrine of the gradual procession of multitude. One could even maintain that, in
his opinion, a correct understanding of the axiom ex uno non nisi unum precludes
19. Cf. In Sap. n. 36 (LW II, 356, 3-7): "sicut omne agens per se semper intendit
ipsum totum, puta artifex domum, partes autem non nisi propter totum et in toto, sic agens
primum, deus, per se et primo produxit et creavit universum habens omnia, singula vero,
utpote partes universi et partes omnium, non nisi propter universum et in universo."
20. The relation of totum and partes allows for further specification. Eckhart treats
the relation of the one universe to its many parts as analogous to the relation of the
soul—forma hominis-io the parts of the human body. This observation underlies a remark-
able study of Bernard Muller-Thym, criticised by Vladimir Lossky. Cf. B. Muller-Thym,
The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckhart of
Hochheim (New York, 1939); V. Lossky, Thέologie negative et Connaissance de Dieu chez
Mattre Eckhart, (Paris, 1960), pp. 122 n. 97, 302-6.
21. Cf. Serm. XXVIII, 2 n. 284 (LW IV, 256, 6-12).
22. In Sap. n. 36 (LW II, 356, 7-13) "Et sic pent quaestio et difficultas, multos
gravans usque hodie, quomodo ab uno simplici, quod est deus, possint esse multa immedi-
ate. Sunt enim qui putant, ut Avicenna et sui sequaces, quod a primo sit primo et immediate
creata intelligentia et ab ilia deinceps alia. Dicendum est enim quod totum universum
tamquam unum totum . . . est ab uno simplici, unum ab uno, primo et immediate."
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all gradual procession. This becomes apparent in a later passage in the commen-
tary on the book of Wisdom, where Eckhart refers back to the passage just cited
with the words: "as has been said in the first chapter concerning the word creavίt
enim, ut essent omnia, since the whole universe and its one being are primarily
intended by the first cause, its parts however and their being only secondarily, they
acquire being from the cause of the universe mediated through the one being of
the universe."23
There is a mutual constitution of unity and multitude, which explains the
procession of the universe and its procession as a universe. Since ex uno non fit
nisi unum, multitude can only be produced insofar as it forms some kind of unity,
that is, the universe, in function of which it is produced. In a similar way, the
inclusion of all of its parts equally is constitutive for this universe as a whole: "Just
as the universe, if it lacked some perfect creature, would neither be perfect nor a
universe, so on the same ground, if it lacked whatever minimal grade of the
universe, it would be neither perfect nor a universe."24 The most perfect creature
and the minimal grades of the universe, angelic nature and a stone or wood,
equally relate to the integritas of the universe and its perfection. That is to say, if
the universe were to descend from the first cause without all of its parts, it simply
could not exist. A correct understanding of the axiom ex uno non nisi unum,
therefore, precludes the doctrine of gradual procession. Quod plerique non con-
siderantes erraverunt et in varias quaestiones vanas et perplexitates inciderunt.
Ill
To understand this Eckhartian doctrine in detail we have to return to still an earlier
juncture in medieval thinking, the Condemnations of 1277.25 Although the dating
of his commentary on the Book of Wisdom remains uncertain, it is beyond doubt
that Eckhart wrote it later than 1277.
Ex uno non fit nisi unum—this axiom is involved in several of the 219 articles
condemned on March 1277 by Stephan Tempier, bishop of Paris.26 Roland His-
23. In Sap. n. 72 (LW II, 401, 8-^02, 2): "sicut supra capitulo primo super illo:
'creavit enim, ut essent omnia' dictum est, quod, sicut totum universum est primo intentum
a causa prima, et esse ipsius universi unum, partes autem quaelibet et ipsarum esse
secundario, accipiunt esse a causa universi mediante ipsi uno esse universi."
24. In Sap. n. 73 (LW II, 403, 4-6): "sicut deficiente creato quolibet perfectissimo
non esset perfectum universum, sed nee universum esset, sic pari ratione deficiente quovis
minimo gradu universi nee perfectum esset universum, sed nee universum esset."
25. For the broader context in Eckhart's doctrine of unity—for creation is but an
instance of the rule that all causality and procession conforms to the axiom ex uno non nisi
unum—cf. W. Goris, Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch Uber die Einheitsmetaphysik des
'Opus tήpartitum'Meister Eckharts (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelal-
ters 59), (Leiden, 1997).
26. Cf. H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I, (Paris,
1889), pp. 543-58; R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 Mars
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sette correctly has interpreted the axiom ex uno non nisi unum as "expression de
la doctrine neoplatonicienne de Vemanation, " a classification nevertheless which
leaves place for alternatives, considering the fact that medieval authors them-
selves perceived the axiom as genuinely Peripatetic.27 And indeed, although
strictly speaking his assertion is not pertinent to the theme, Aristotle himself is
habitually quoted as holding in De generatione et corruptione that "the same,
remaining in a like disposition, always produces the same."28 It is above all,
however, in the Arabic tradition that the axiom ex uno non nisi unum is affirmed.29
Here it is correlated with the doctrine of the gradual procession of multitude, a
thesis which, as we saw, Cusanus and Eckhart assigned to Avicenna, although
Maimonides read the association of ex uno non nisi unum and the gradual proces-
sion of multitude in Aristotle.30
It should be noted that the relevant Parisian articles were condemned in the
first place because of this doctrine of the gradual procession of multitude. Eck-
hart's unequalled defense of the axiom ex uno non nisi unum does not compromise
his work as a Christian directly, although it is peculiar and indeed significant that
he holds this thesis after the Condemnations of 1277. According to Bernard
Muller-Thym, it is his adherence to the tradition of Albert the Great that accounts
for Eckhart's apparent disregard for the ecclesiastical intervention.31
The French scholar Alain de Libera most convincingly demonstrated the
1277, (Louvain, 1977). Immediately relevant are articles 44 and 64 according to the order
in the Chartularium, 28 and 33 in Hissette: (44/28): "Quod ab uno primo agente non potest
esse multitudo effectuum;" (64/33): "Quod effectus inmediatus a primo debet esse unus
tantum et simillimus primo." Hissette relates both articles to the influence of the axiom ab
uno (simplici) non procedit nisi unum (immediate) on Siger of Brabant. Cf. Hissette,
Enquete sur les 219 articles, pp. 70ff.
27. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles, pp. 70-72. Cf. A. de Libera, "Ex uno non
fit nisi unum. La Lettre sur le Principe de Vunivers et les condamnations parisiennes de
1277," in: B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta, ed., Hίstoria philosophiae medii aevi. Studien zur
Geschίchte der Philosophic des Mittelalters I, (Amsterdam, 1991), p. 546: "La notion de
«neoplatonisme» employee par R. Hissette n'est evidemment pas une categorie de Γhisto-
riographie medievale—les textes cites renvoient d'aillieurs a «Aristote, Avicenne, Algazel
et a la quasi-totalite des peripateticiens»."
28. Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 11,10 (336a27-28): "Idem enim eodem modo se habens
non est natum facere nisi unum et idem." Cf. translatio vetus (ed. Judycka, 74, 16-17):
"idem enim et similiter habens semper idem innatum est facere."
29. Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. IX,4 (ed. Van Riet, 481,50-51): "Nosti etiam quod ex uno,
secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum." Cf. Ghazali, Metaph. 1,4 (ed. Muckle,
117,33-34); 1,5 (ed. Muckle, 119, 9-11, and 24-26). Cf. Averroes, Metaph. XII comm. 44
(ed. Ven., 327vl): "ab uno et simplici non provenit nisi unum."
30. Cf. Maimonides, Dux neutr. 11,23 (ed. Justinianus, fol. 53v): "Aristoteles et omnes
qui profundaverunt in philosophia, convenerunt in hac propositione, quod ex simplici non
potest provenire nisi unum simplex. . . . Et secundum hanc intentionem dixit Aristoteles,
quod a creatore non provenit proventu primo nisi unus intellectus simplex solummodo." Cf.
A. Hyman, "From What is One and Simple only What is One and Simple Can Come to Be," in
Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought, ed. L. E. Goodman (Albany, NY, 1992, pp. 111-35).
31. Cf. Muller-Thym, The Establishment of the University of Being, pp. 95ff.
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significance of the axiom ex uno non fit nisi unum in the thought of Albert the
Great,32 who himself claims to have read this axiom in an Epistola de principio
universί esse formally attributed to Aristotle.33 Deeming it a genuine Peripatetic
thesis, Albert even goes so far as to call it self-evident: "per se nota est propositio,
quod ab uno omnino non est nisi unum. " 3 4 It is clear that an immense dilemma
arises, especially for his students, when such a propositio per se nota is con-
demned by the Church.35 Albert was not unaware of the problematic aspects of
the axiom ex uno non nisi unum; rather, he regarded its problems as arising from
misapprehension. Whereas all of the peripatetici concede the axiom, Albert ob-
serves in his commentary on the Liber de causis, it is rejected by some theologi,
who apparently fail to understand it correctly.36 In his Summa theologica, Albert
tries to reassure these theologians, confining the axiom ex uno non nisi unum to
the ordo naturae—a strategy commonly adopted in the thirteenth century.37
Whereas in Albert we find the necessity of defending the self-evident axiom
ex uno non nisi unum against its ecclesiastical condemnation, the distinct form that
Echart's solution of the dilemma receives originates in the thought of one of the
theologi Albert disdained, namely Bonaventure. In his commentary on the second
book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Bonaventure raises the question
"whether the first principle produced everything by itself or through the mediation
of something else?"38 His approach to the question is very representative, and in
its repudiation of the phίlosophί rather illustrative as well.
32. Contra: M. Grabmann, "Die Lehre des heiligen Albertus Magnus vom Grunde der
Vielheit der Dinge und der lateinische Averroismus," in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben III
(Mϋnchen, 1936), pp. 287-312.
33. Cf. besides the mentioned article his study Albert le Grand et la Philosophie,
(Paris, 1990), pp. 64ff. Fully in accordance with the perspective of de Libera is the excellent
inaugural dissertation of Therese Marie Bonin, The Origin of Diversity in Albertus Magnus'
De causis etprocessu universitatίs aprima causa (Notre Dame, 1993).
34. Albert, Physica 8, 2, 11 {Opera omnia IV,2, ed. Hossfeld, 615,15).
35. Ulrich of Strasbourg, for instance, tries a trinitarian interpretation of the axiom ex
uno non fit nisi unum-De summo bono I, 1, 2 (ed. Mojsisch, 8-9). Cf. Muller-Thym, The
Establishment of the University of Being, pp. 98-99.
36. Albert, De causis etprocessu universitatis aprima causa I, 1, 10 {Opera omnia
XVΠ,2, ed. Fauser, 22,-15): "Decima proprietas est, quod a primo, quod est necesse esse,
immediate non potest esse nisi unum. Et hoc quidem iam omnes concesserunt Peripatetici,
quamvis hoc quidam non intelligentes negaverint theologi. «Idem enim eodem modo se
habens non est natum facere nisi unum et idem». Habitum autem est, quod primum est
unum et idem et eodem modo se habens eo quod est impermutabile. Necesse est ergo, quod
immediate non sit ab ipso nisi unum et idem. Nee hoc est contra theologum, quia Dionysius
dicit, quod ea quae sunt a primo, per distantiam ab ipso accipiunt differentiam. Relata
autem ad ipsum et in ipsum unum sunt et idem. Similiter Peripateticus concedit, quod a
primo per primum et immediatum, quod aliquo modo distat ab ipso, tota producitur rerum
universitas."
37. Cf. Albert, Summa theol. II, 1, 3 (ed. Borgnet 33, 26): "Ad id quod objicitur, quod
ab uno non est nisi unum, dicendum, quod hoc est verum in agentibus per se, et per naturae
necessitatem . . . Sed in operantibus per intellectum et per voluntatem, non est verum."
38. Bonaventure, In. II Sent. 1, 1, 2, 2 {Opera omnia II, 28a): "Utrum primum
principium produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio."
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To hold that God produced things by another agent, Bonaventure says,
offends truth and faith, and not only faith, but reason as well.39 It is simply absurd
(omnino contra rationem) to accept the idea of production out of nothing in the
case of an agent of finite power. Even a philosopher—one notes the faintness of
Bonaventure's praise!—even a philosopher has not made such a claim yet.40 The
error of the philosophers rather consists in the recognition of a gradually descend-
ing order in production, in the recognition, that is to say, of mediation.41 Interest-
ingly enough, Bonaventure claims that this position can be shown to be erroneous.
This error relies on a false argument, since it says that because God is most
simple, He produces only one. This, however, rather speaks for the opposite,
for the more something is simple, the more it is powerful, and the more it is
powerful, the more it has power over many things. Hence, if God is most
simple, He therefore has power over all things without a medium.42
Bonaventure thus wants to show that the axiom ex uno non nisi unum is already
to be rejected on argumentative grounds alone, that is, without recourse to faith.
He overtly challenges Albert on the philosophical level. Whereas the German
Dominican lists the axiom as self-evident, Bonaventure is aware of its philosophi-
cal inadequacy.
In my view, Eckhart's clarification of the axiom ex uno non nisi unum is to
be understood in its divergent filiation vis-a-vis these positions of Albert the Great
and Bonaventure. Eckhart adopts from Albert the belief in the rational defensibil-
ity of the axiom, from Bonaventure the objection that its explanation actually
advocates the immediate production of all things by God. From the One immedi-
ately comes only one thing, whose perfection consists in the inclusion of plurality.
What at first glance may seem quite paradoxical, namely that Eckhart's practice
39. Bonaventure, In.Π Sent. 1,1,2,2 (Opera omnia II, 29a): "Dicendum, quod ponere,
quod Deus produxerit res per aliud agens, est contra veritatem et contra fidem, . . . nee
solum contra fidem, verum etiam contra rationem."
40. Bonaventure, In II Sent. 1,1,2,2 (Opera omnia II, 29a): "Et ponenti res omnes
productas ex nihilo, omnino est contra rationem, ita ut non possit capi, quomodo agens
potentiae finitae aliquid ex nihilo producat. Nee credo, aliquem philosophorum hoc po-
suisse."
41. Bonaventure, In II Sent. 1,1,2,2 (Opera omnia II, 29a): "plures fuerunt philoso-
phi, qui posuerunt ordinem in producendo gradatim descendendo."
42. Bonaventure, In II Sent. 1,1,2,2 (Opera omnia II, 29a): "iste error . . . falsam
habet rationem. Dicit enίm, quod, quia simplicissimus est Deus, non producit nisi unum;
sed hoc magis est ad oppositum, quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius, et quanto
potentius, tanto in plura potest: ergo si Deus simplicissimus, hoc ipso potest in omnia sine
medio."
Without doubt, this argument of Bonaventure influenced the second part of Eckhart's
commentary on Sap. 7:27 ("Et cum sit una, omnia potest"), where it is explained that
"quanto quid est simplicius et unitius, tanto est potentius et virtuosius, plura potens. .
. . Ergo quod est simpliciter unum—et ipsum solum—potest omnia" (In Sap. nn. 156-57;
LW 11,492,1-493,5).
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of the axiom ex uno non nisi unum is to be explained from the position of one of
its adversaries, reveals a strategy of mediation, a restricted reaction to the Con-
demnations of 1277.
As we have seen, Eckhart of Hochheim supplied Nicholas of Cusa with a thesis
on the mediative function of the universe in the relation between God and crea-
tures. Whereas in Eckhart, the focus is on the productive dimension of this
relation, in De docta ίgnorantia the mediative function of the universe obtains a
broader scope, eventually founding Anaxagora's quodlibet in quolibet. Mediated
through the one universe, God is in all things and all things are in God. The
necessity of such mediation by the universe derives from the absurdity Nicholas
seeks to exclude, that God be contracted, immediately inhering in particulars.
Ultimately, it is in Giordano Bruno that the mediating universe is left out.
Defending in De la causa, principio et uno Anaxagora's dictum quodlibet in
quolibet largely within the context of Nicholas's reasoning,43 Bruno argued at the
same time that God is in all things immediately.44 The outcomes are well known,
and illustrate the perils of a way of thinking pursued by Eckhart and Cusanus.
43. On Bruno's rendering of the Anaxagorean dictum cf. P.-H. Michel, La cosmologie
de Giordano Bruno (Paris, 1962), p. 266; and more generally W. Beierwaltes, "Identitat
ohne Differenz? Zur Kosmologie und Theologie Giordano Brunos," in Identitάt und Dif-
ferent. (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), pp. 176-203.
44. Cf. Giordano Bruno, Summa term, metaph. {Opera latine conscripta I, 4, 81):
"Deum intelligamus in omnibus et omnia in Deo non eodem modo; Deus in omnibus
tanquam contίnens, in Deo tanquam contenta ab eo, sicque Deus in omnibus immediate, in
Deo omnia non immediate."
